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Abstract. This work contains two major parts: comprehensively study-
ing the security notions of cryptographic hash functions against quan-
tum attacks and the relationships between them; and revisiting whether
Merkle-Damg˚ard and related iterated hash constructions preserve the
security properties of the compression function in the quantum setting.
Specifically, we adapt the seven notions in Rogaway and Shrimpton
(FSE’04) to the quantum setting and prove that the seemingly stronger
attack model where an adversary accesses a challenger in quantum su-
perposition does not make a difference. We confirm the implications and
separations between the seven properties in the quantum setting, and in
addition we construct explicit examples separating an inherently quan-
tum notion called collapsing from several proposed properties. Finally,
we pin down the properties that are preserved under several iterated hash
schemes. In particular, we prove that the ROX construction in Andreeva
et al. (Asiacrypt’07) preserves the seven properties in the quantum ran-
dom oracle model.
Keywords: Quantum random-oracle model, Post-quantum security def-
initions, Hash functions
1 Introduction
Cryptographic hash functions, which produce a short digest on an input mes-
sage efficiently, are a ubiquitous building block in modern cryptography. They
are indispensable in constructing key-establishment, authentication, encryption,
digital signature, cryptocurrency, and more, which constitute the backbone of
a secure cyberspace. A host of cryptographic hash functions have been de-
signed [NIS15] which have been subject to extensive cryptanalysis. Most of the
constructions follow the iterated hash paradigm, which iterates a compression
function on a small domain.
The emerging technology of quantum computing brings devastating chal-
lenges to cryptography. In addition to breaking widely deployed public-key cryp-
tography due to Shor’s efficient quantum algorithm for factoring and discrete
logarithm, effective quantum attacks on symmetric primitives have been found
in recent years that break of a variety of message authentication and authenti-
cated encryption schemes [KLLNP16,SS17].
In this work, we revisit two fundamental threads of cryptographic hash func-
tions in the presence of quantum attacks: modeling basic security properties and
establishing their interrelations; and pinning down whether the iterated hash
constructions preserve the security of the underlying compression functions.
A principal security property is collision resistance: It should be computa-
tionally infeasible to compute a collision (x,x′) such that H(x) = H(x′). Two
other basic properties are preimage resistance (Pre) and second-preimage resis-
tance (Sec). Rogaway and Shrimpton extend the three and arrive at a total of
seven properties to cope with various scenarios [RS04]. More specifically, they
consider a family of hash functions H ∶ K ×M → D. Conventional Pre and Sec
require that under a random key, it is infeasible to find a preimage of a random
digest or to find a message that forms a collision with a given random input.
They propose two variations named always and everywhere. For example, al-
ways preimage resistance (aPre) allows an attacker to pick a key K at will, and
HK needs to be preimage resistant in the usual sense. This reflects that real-
world hash functions are standalone (i.e., unkeyed), so it is important to always
enforce the property on all members in the hash family. In a complementary
vein everywhere preimage resistance (ePre), for instance, asks about finding a
preimage on any digest (i.e., adversarially chosen as opposed to a random one)
being hard. They give a comprehensive characterization of the seven properties,
including both implications and separations. For instance, they show that while
Coll implies standard Pre, there exist Coll hash functions that are not aPre or
ePre. This motivates our first question of this work:
How do we model these properties appropriately against quantum attacks, and
what are the relationships between them?
Once the appropriate quantum security notions have been nailed down,
we would like to construct hash functions achieving various desired proper-
ties. The dominating design framework is iterated hashing, which takes a com-
pression function on a relatively small domain and runs it iteratively, with
minor variations, to process longer messages. The Merkle-Damg˚ard construc-
tion [Mer89,Dam89] (adopted by SHA-1,2 families) and the sponge construc-
tion [BDPA07] (adopted in SHA-3) are notable examples. As a modular approach
to attaining security, researchers ask whether the iterated hash preserves the se-
curity of the compression function. It is known that Merkle-Damg˚ard is collision
resistant as long as the compression function is collision resistant. However it
does not preserve preimage resistance: There is a preimage-resistant compression
function, such that plugging it into Merkle-Damg˚ard fails to result in preimage-
resistance. Andreeva et al. [ANPS07] study several variants of Merkle-Damg˚ard,
such as XOR-linear [BR97] and Shoup’s [Sho00] hash schemes, and determine
their security-preserving capabilities. In short, none of them are able to preserve
all seven properties. They therefore propose a new iterated construction, ROX,
built on XOR-linear hash, and prove that it preserves all seven properties in the
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random oracle model1. In contrast, we refer to other constructions as being in
the plain model. We pose the second major question of this work:
Is ROX security preserving in the quantum setting?
A positive answer will dramatically simplify the design of secure hash func-
tions to the design of a secure compression function of a small size. Answering this
question, however, could be challenging and subtle. What we prove classically
often fails to carry over against quantum attacks for some fundamental reasons
(e.g., no-cloning of quantum states or probabilistic analysis that has no counter-
part in the quantum formalism). There has been extensive work developing tools
for analyzing quantum security [Wat09,Unr12,Son14,Zha12a]. In particular, Un-
ruh proves that Merkle-Damg˚ard preserves collapsing, and it can be observed
that collision resistance is also preserved in the quantum setting. More specific to
ROX, the random oracle model faces grave difficulties in the presence of quantum
adversaries [BDF+11]. For example, classically one can easily simulate a random
oracle by lazy sampling the responses upon every query on-the-fly. A quantum
query, which can be in superposition of all possible inputs seems to force the
function to be completely specified at the onset. Likewise, the powerful trick of
programming a random oracle, i.e., changing the outputs on some input points
as long as they have not been queried before, appears impossible if quantum
queries are permitted. Recently, there is progress on restoring proof techniques
including programming a quantum random oracle [ARU14,Unr14,ES15,HRS16].
Our contributions. We investigate the two questions systematically in this work.
The main results are summarized below.
We formalize the seven security notions in the quantum setting2. Since all
properties are described in simple interactive games, we face two options to
modeling quantum attackers depending on whether the interface between the
challenger and the adversary remains classical or can also be quantum. We call
the latter “fully” or “strong” quantum attacks, reminiscent of an active line of
work recently [BZ13,Unr14,AR17]. This stronger type of attack is more realistic
in some cases than others. Our interesting finding is that which model we use
makes no difference in this setting, by a simple observation of commutativity
of some quantum operators. Namely, the security property (e.g. aPre) against a
quantum adversary and classical communication with the challenger is equivalent
to that where the access to the challenger can be quantum too.
We depict the landscape of the seven notions in the quantum setting as well
as the collapsing property, by fully determining their relationships (Figure 2a).
For most of the existing implications and separations in [RS04], we apply a
general lifting tool in [Son14] to make analogous conclusions in the quantum
setting. We construct new examples to separate collapsing from our quantum
1 The compression function is not given as a random oracle. Rather apart from the
compression function, the construction has access to a public random function that
is given as a black-box.
2 Some standard notions have appeared in the literature before [HRS16].
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notions of aSecQ and eSecQ, and derive other relations by transitivity. Unruh’s
separation example between collapsing and collision resistance [Unr16b] is the
only one that is relative to an oracle.
We determine the security-preserving capabilities of various iterated hash
constructions. We show that the results in [ANPS07] (other than ROX) can be
“lifted” into a quantum setting. As to ROX, we adapt techniques of programming
a quantum random oracle and show that ROX preserves all security properties
we consider in this work.
Discussion. As Andreeva et al. remarked in their work, ROX is proven secure in
the random oracle model. Can we design an iterated hash that is all-preserving
in the plain model? Recently there is another quantum notion extending col-
lision resistance proposed in [AMRS18] termed Bernoulli-preserving. It implies
collapsing and appears stronger. Do the iterated hash constructions preserve
collapsing and Bernoulli-preserving of the compression function? Another inter-
esting future direction is to investigate whether iterated hash can be amplifying,
especially with the assistance of a random oracle such as in ROX. Finally, we
consider variants of the Merkle-Damg˚ard and Merkle Tree constructions. Less is
known about the versatile sponge construction in terms of security-preserving of
round functions. It has been shown very recently that the sponge is collapsing
assuming the round functions are truly random [CBH+18].
2 Preliminaries
Notations. Hash-function properties are formulated as games with a challenger
C and an adversary A. C and A perform one or more rounds of communication,
after which C outputs a bit indicating whether A “won”. Our proofs take the form
of reductions, where winning the game allows us to create an adversary to win
another game that is supposed to be hard. Following on [Son14], we formalize a
reduction as a tuple (Gint,T ,Gext) where Gext is the game that is assumed to be
hard, Gint is the game we would like to show to be secure, and T transforms an
adversary A for Gint into one for Gext. If T is efficient and maintains A’s success
probability up to a negligible difference, showing the existence of a reduction is
a proof by contradiction that Gint is hard.
We are concerned primarily with quantum adversaries. These are adversaries
that run in polynomial time on a quantum computer (qpt). We call the probabil-
ity that this adversary succeeds its “advantage”, denoted by Advprop
H
(A), where
H is a hash function. By AdvpropH , we mean the maximum advantage over qpt
adversaries. When discussing concrete security, we say that H is (t, ε)-prop if for
all adversaries A running in time at most t, AdvpropH A ≤ ε. When the interaction
between C and an adversary has two rounds, we sometimes refer to an adversary
as having two parts (A,B). In this case, they share a state register S, which
the challenger may not read or modify. By convention, we use capital letters to
indicate quantum registers. Measuring a quantum register (M(⋅)) results in a
classical value, which we denote with the corresponding lowercase letter.
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We assume there exists a security parameter n for each hash function that
corresponds to the size of a key. A probability is negligible, denoted negl(n), if
it is less than 1
poly(n)
, where poly(⋅) is any polynomial function. By τH , we mean
the time required to compute H . We indicate sampling from a distribution or
receiving a result from a probabilistic algorithm by x← S. When S is a set, this
indicates uniform sampling, unless otherwise noted.
Quantum random oracles. One goal of this paper is to translate results about the
ROX construction from the classical (RO) to the quantum (QRO) random oracle
model. In general, results proven in the classical RO model do not necessarily
carry over to a quantum setting, and even when they do, the techniques often
need to be modified.
Even efficiently simulating a random oracle—a simple task in a classical set-
ting, since an algorithm can simply lazily answer poly(n) queries—is not obvi-
ously possible in a quantum setting. A quantum query could be a superposition
of exponentially many inputs, naively requiring an exponential number of sam-
ples from the oracle’s codomain to simulate. Zhandry showed that it is possible
to efficiently simulate a random oracle using 2q samples, where q is the num-
ber of queries made to the oracle (Corollary 1 of Theorem 3.1 from [Zha12b]).
Whenever we refer to simulating a QRO, we refer to this technique.
Another property of classical random oracles is that they can be adaptively
programmed. That is, even after a polynomial number of queries have been
made, the algorithm simulating the oracle can change the output of the oracle
at some input points, since it is unlikely that A has seen the output at those
points. However, a single quantum query in superposition can “see” the output
at all points of the domain. We use a technique for programming a quantum
random oracle from [ES15], which defines a “witness-search” game in which an
adversary must guess a “witness” wˆ with P (wˆ) = 1, given some predicate P
and public information pk chosen by the challenger, given that the challenger
knows a witness w. The probability that any qpt adversary detects adaptive
programming at a point x with P (wˆ) = 1 is at most his success probability in
witness search.
Standard hash-function security. Rogaway and Shrimpton [RS04] identify seven
properties of hash functions. These consist of the standard collision resistance
(Coll), preimage resistance (Pre), and second-preimage resistance (Sec), as well
as two stronger variants of each of the latter two—“always” (aPre, aSec) and
“everywhere” (ePre,eSec)—which give the adversary more power. The following
defines standard collision, preimage, and second-preimage resistance:
AdvCollH (A) = Pr[x /= x
′
∧Hk(x) =Hk(x′) ∶ k ← K;x,x′ ← A(1n, k)] (1)
AdvPreH (A) = Pr[Hk(x) = y ∶ k ← K;x
′ ←M ;y =Hk(x′);x ← A(1n, k, y)] (2)
AdvSecH (A) = Pr[x /= x
′
∧Hk(x) =Hk(x′) ∶ k ← K;x′ ←M ;x← A(1n, k, x′)]
(3)
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Note that the challenger chooses the key k, and in the latter two properties,
challenger chooses the target that the preimage needs to match. A successful
adversary needs to work with non-negligible probability regardless of what the
challenger chooses. One way to create a stronger property would be to relax this
requirement on either the key or the preimage target.
Allowing the adversary to choose the key results in the “always” variants of
preimage and second-preimage resistance. Here, the adversary is given as a pair
of algorithms (A,B): A is responsible for choosing the key, and B is responsible
for guessing the preimage.
AdvaPreH (A,B) =Pr[Hk(x) = y
∶ k,S ← A(1n);x′ ←M ;y =Hk(x′);x ← B(1n, S, y)] (4)
AdvaSecH (A,B) =Pr[x /= x
′
∧Hk(x) =Hk(x′)
∶ k,S ← A(1n);x′ ←M ;x← B(1n, S, x′)] (5)
Alternatively, allowing the adversary to choose the target the preimage must
match before knowing the key results in the “everywhere” variants of these
properties:
AdvePreH (A,B) =Pr[Hk(x) = y ∶ y,S ← A(1
n);k ← K;x ← B(1n, S, k)] (6)
AdveSecH (A,B) =Pr[x /= x
′
∧Hk(x) =Hk(x′)
∶ x′, S ← A(1n);k ← K;x ← B(1n, S, k)] (7)
k
A
S
BX
✌
✌
y b(a) Game1
k
A
S
BX
y b(b) Game2
Fig. 1: Games defining the CLAPS property.
A standard quantum-only property is called “collapsing” [Unr16b,Unr16a]
(CLAPS). Let y ∈ D be an element of the digest space of Hk. CLAPS cap-
tures the idea that it should be difficult for an adversary to produce a “useful”
superposition of elements of the set H−1k (y) ⊆ M. If a hash function is not col-
lapsing, an adversary may be able to find some input-output pair with desirable
properties even if it can succeed with only negligible advantage in the Coll game.
An adversary for CLAPS is a pair of qpt algorithms (A,B). On input k, A
outputs quantum registers S,X and a classical register y. We call the adversary
“correct” if Pr[Hk(M(X)) = y] = 1, and we restrict our attention to correct
adversaries. On input S,X , B outputs a classical bit b that represents a guess
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whether X has been measured. The collapsing advantage AdvCLAPSH (A,B) =
∣Pr[b = 1 ∶ Game1]−Pr[b = 1 ∶ Game2]∣, where Game1,2 are as shown in Fig. 1.
3 Quantum security properties of hash functions
We adapt the above notions from [RS04] to a quantum setting by allowing the
adversary to be qpt, rather than ppt, as in the original definitions. The hash
function is public, so he can make superposition queries to it, but all interac-
tions with the challenger are classical. With the exception of the poly(n)-qubit
state register S, we assume that the adversary measures all of its wires before
outputting them. We call these variants CollQ, PreQ, etc.
It would be natural to ask whether stronger properties result from allowing
the interface between the adversary and the challenger to be quantum. In other
words, the adversary does not measure its wires before outputting them. At the
end, the challenger measures all registers to determine whether the adversary
has succeeded. These properties, which we call “strongly quantum” (SQ), are
defined as follows, where K, Y , and X ′ are quantum registers:
AdvCollSQH (A) =Pr[x /= x
′
∧Hk(x) =Hk(x′)
∶ k ← K;X,X ′ ← A(1n, k);x,x′ ←M(X,X ′)] (8)
AdvPreSQH (A) =Pr[Hk(x) = y
∶ k ← K;x′ ←M ;y =Hk(x′);X ← A(1n, k, y);x ←M(X)] (9)
AdvSecSQH (A) =Pr[x /= x
′
∧Hk(x) =Hk(x′)
∶ k ← K;x′ ←M ;X ← A(1n, k, x′);x←M(X)] (10)
AdvaPreSQH (A) =Pr[Hk(x) = y
∶ K,S ← A(1n);x′ ←M ;Y = UH(x′)(K ⊗ ∣0⟩);
X ← B(1n, S, Y );k,x ←M(K,X)] (11)
AdvaSecSQH (A) =Pr[x /= x
′
∧Hk(x) =Hk(x′)
∶ K,S ← A(1n);x′ ←M ;X ← B(1n, S, x′);k,x ←M(K,X)]
(12)
AdvePreSQ
H
(A) =Pr[Hk(x) = y
∶ Y,S ← A(1n);k ← K;X ← B(1n, S, k);x, y ←M(X,Y )]
(13)
AdveSecSQH (A) =Pr[x /= x
′
∧Hk(x) =Hk(x′)
∶ X ′, S ← A(1n);k ← K;X ← B(1n, S, k);x,x′ ←M(X,X ′)]
(14)
In (11), UH(x′) is quantum gate that acts as UH(x′) ∶ ∣k⟩ ∣y⟩↦ ∣k⟩ ∣y ⊕Hk(x′)⟩.
In other words, given a key registerK in superposition, it outputs a superposition
of digests for x′.
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It is easy to see that CollSQ, PreSQ, and SecSQ(8, 9, and 10) are equivalent
to their counterparts (1, 2, and 3) defined above: The challenger immediately
measures the adversary’s output registers, so without loss of generality, we may
assume that the adversary measures all output registers itself.
As it happens, the other SQ properties (11–14) are equivalent to the above
versions (4–7) as well. Intuitively, this is because, although A can put a super-
position of values on its output register, the challenger never gives this register
to B. If the challenger did so, it would be unable to check whether the adversary
had won, since it would no longer have a copy of that register. Hence, the quan-
tum “interface” with the challenger gives the adversary no additional power in
this case.
A more formal proof requires us to show the equivalence of two quantum
circuits. We give the full proof for aPreQ ≡ aPreSQ in Appendix B. The proofs
for aSecQ, ePreQ, and eSecQ are similar, but slightly more straightforward, in
that they do not require Lemma 8.
4 Relations of quantum security properties
CLAPS
CollQ
aSecQ
SecQ
eSecQ
aPreQ
PreQ
ePreQ
(a)
SecQ aSecQ eSecQ PreQ aPreQ ePreQ CollQ CLAPS
SecQ - ⇏ ⇏ ⇒ ⇏ ⇏ ⇏ ↣̸
aSecQ ⇒ - ⇏ ⇒ ⇒ ⇏ ⇏ ↣̸
eSecQ ⇒ ⇏ - ⇒ ⇏ ⇏ ⇏ ↣̸
PreQ ⇏ ⇏ ⇏ - ⇏ ⇏ ⇏ ↣̸
aPreQ ⇏ ⇏ ⇏ ⇒ - ⇏ ⇏ ↣̸
ePreQ ⇏ ⇏ ⇏ ⇒ ⇏ - ⇏ ↣̸
CollQ ⇒ ⇏ ⇒ ⇒ ⇏ ⇏ - ↝̸
CLAPS ↣ ↛ ↣ ↣ ↛ ↛ → -
(b)
Fig. 2: The relationships between the properties defined in Sect. 3. In Fig. 2a,
solid arrows indicate implications. Everywhere an arrow (or a transitive impli-
cation) is absent indicates a separation. In Fig. 2b, → and ↛ are implications
with explicit proofs, and ↣ and ↣̸ hold by transitivity,⇒ and ⇏ indicate quan-
tumly “lifted” classical reductions. The dotted arrow in Fig. 2a and ↝̸ in Fig. 2b
indicate that only a relativized separation has been shown [Unr16b].
In this section, we examine the relationships among the properties in Sect. 3.
Fig. 2 illustrates these graphically. The relationships among the properties with
classical analogs carry over from the classical setting, based on the framework
from [Son14]. The following is a sufficient criterion for “lifting” a reduction from
a classical to a quantum setting:
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Lemma 1 (Corrollary 4.6 from [Son14]). Let R = (Gext,T ,Gint) be a black-
box reduction that holds for ppt machines, and suppose the following:
1. Gint(A) and Gext(A) are defined for qpt A;
2. ∣AdvG
int
( A) −Adv
Gext(T (A))∣ ≤ negl(n) for all qpt A;
3. when T runs A, it runs it “in a straight line until completion,” i.e., as an
honest challenger would; and
4. for all A,A′ with AdvG
int
(A) = AdvG
ext
(A′), AdvG
ext
(T (A)) = AdvG
ext
(T (A′)).
Then R holds for qpt machines as well.
All the classical implication proofs from [RS04] (⇒ from Fig. 2b) satisfy the
hypotheses in Lemma 1, and thus that these proofs can be lifted into a quantum
setting. For example, the standard proof that Coll → eSec involves creating a
reduction (Gext = Coll,T ,Gint = eSec) where T is defined as follows:
T ∶ A↦ A′
1. Sample x←M and send it to the challenger.
2. Receive k from C.
3. Run A(1n, k, x) to get x′ and send (x,x′) to the challenger.
Note that T could be applied to a quantum A for eSecQ as easily as a classical
one for eSec, and the result, T (A) finds a collision in the CollQ game. This
is guaranteed due to the classical “interface” in the definitions from Sect. 3.
Moreover, it runs A as normal. So hypotheses 1 and 3 from Lemma 1 hold.
Hypothesis 2 holds as well, since the success probabilities of A and T (A) are
the same Hypothesis 4 captures the idea that the success probability of T (A)
depends only on the success probability of A, not some specific facet of its
internal behavior. This is easily seen to be the case here.
The classical separations from [RS04] (⇏ from Fig. 2b) can also be lifted in
a similar fashion. For example, the proof that Coll does not imply aSec runs as
follows: Suppose that H is Coll. We define a new function H ′ such that if k /= 0,
H ′k(x) = Hk(x), but H0(x) = 0. There is a trivial attack for aSec on H
′: The
adversary simply chooses k = 0 and outputs any x′ /= x as a second preimage.
Finally, we show that H ′ is still collision resistant using a simple reduction. The
first half of this proof (the attack) is clearly as possible on a quantum computer
as it is on a classical one. In fact, the structure of the properties from Sect. 3
(excluding CLAPS)—where the adversary is given classical input and must pro-
duce classical output—guarantees this. Moreover, as with the implication proofs,
the reductions in the separation proofs satisfy the hypotheses in Lemma 1. So
we conclude that these separations hold in a quantum setting as well.
We additionally examine the relationships between collapsing and each of the
standard properties. Unruh shows in [Unr16b] that collapsing implies collision
resistance, and this proof applies to CollQ as well. This leads to the transitive
implications from CLAPS in Fig. 2b. We find that CLAPS does not imply aPreQ,
aSecQ, or ePreQ. The proofs of these separations are given in Appendix A.
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5 Quantum security preservations of iterated hash
constructions
In this section, we consider whether several standard iterated hash constructions,
including one in the random oracle model (ROX), preserve the quantum-safe
properties from Sect. 3. The constructions we consider are the same as those
considered in [ANPS07], and we find that they preserve (and fail to preserve) the
quantum analogs of the same properties that [ANPS07] show they do classically.
In the case of the standard constructions, we omit explicit proofs, instead using
the lifting framework we introduced in Sect. 4. The proofs for ROX, meanwhile,
are more subtle, since they must be adapted to the quantum random oracle
model. We give explicit proofs in the most interesting of these cases.
Andreeva et al. discuss eleven standard iterated hash constructions, prov-
ing exhaustively (with a few exceptions) which of the seven classical properties
from [RS04] they preserve. These proofs are amenable to being “lifted” to a
quantum setting by reasoning similar to that in Sect. 4: Each implication proof
uses a reduction that satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 1. Each separation com-
bines an attack, which is still possible in a quantum setting given the nature of
the games we consider, and a reduction, which also satisfies the hypotheses.
In contrast, we cannot use Lemma 1 to lift the proofs for the random-oracle
model construction ROX. In particular, the reductions used cannot claim to run
A identically to an honest challenger, since they must simulate a pair of random
oracles. This violates Hypothesis 3 of the lemma. Although the same results
hold, the proofs must be explicitly adapted, which we do below.
5.1 ROX preserves all quantum properties
Definition 1 (ROX). ROX
(H)
k
= ROX
(H)
k ○ padROX
padROX ∶ {0,1}
∗ → ({0,1}b)∗
x ↦ truncb(x∥RO2(x¯, ∣x∣,1)∥RO2(x¯, ∣x∣,2)∥ . . . )
ROX
(H)
k ∶ ({0,1}
b)∗ → {0,1}d
Λ ↦ IV
x1∥ . . . ∥xi ↦Hk(xi∥ROX
(H)
k (x1∥ . . . ∥xi−1)⊕RO1(x¯, k, ν(i)))
where Λ is the empty string; ν(i) is the largest integer such that 2ν(i) divides i;
x¯ is the first n bits of x; IV ∈ {0,1}d is a fixed string; and
– H ∶ {0,1}n × {0,1}m → {0,1}d, where b = m − d > 0 is the block size, and
d ≥ 2b;
– RO1 ∶ {0,1}2n+logL → {0,1}d and RO2 ∶ {0,1}n+2 logL → {0,1}2n are ran-
dom oracles, where L is the maximum input size in blocks; and
– truncb truncates its input to a multiple of b bits;
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We denote the block length of x as ℓ(x) = ⌈(∣x∣ + 2n)/b⌉, the number of padding
blocks as 1 ≤ q2(x) ≤ ⌈ b+2n−12n ⌉, and the total oracle queries as q(x) = ℓ(x)+q2(x).
Andreeva et al. [ANPS07] describe an iterated hash called ROX (Definition 1)
that preserves all of the classical properties discussed in [RS04]. In addition to
a compression function, ROX relies on two random oracles (RO1,2), although it
does not rely on this fact for all proofs. Specifically, ROX preserves aPre, Pre,
aSec, and Sec in the random oracle (RO) model, and Coll, ePre, and eSec in the
standard model.
We show that ROX also preserves the quantum analogs of these properties.
Andreeva et al.’s standard-model proofs carry over nearly unchanged for CollQ,
ePreQ, and eSecQ carry over nearly unchanged, so we omit those proofs. We show
that ROX preserves aPreQ, PreQ, aSecQ, and SecQ, replacing the classical RO
model with the QRO model.
We begin by stating the existence of some constructions using ROX that will
be useful in our proofs. The full constructions are given in Appendix C.
Lemma 2 (Extracting collisions on Hk from collisions on ROX
(H)
k
).
Given xˆ, xˆ′ ∈ dom(ROX(H)
k
) with xˆ /= xˆ′ and ROX(H)
k
(xˆ) = ROX(H)
k
(xˆ′), we can
extract x,x′ ∈ dom(Hk) with x /= x′ and Hk(x) = Hk(x′) except with probability
1
2n
using ℓ(xˆ) + ℓ(xˆ′) applications of H and q(xˆ) + q(xˆ′) oracle queries.
Lemma 3 (Embedding inputs for Hk into inputs for ROX
(H)). Given
an input x for Hk and an index i, we can create an input xˆ for ROX
(H)
k
such
that the input to the ith application of Hk is x using i calls to H and at most
⌈ b+2n−1
2n
⌉ + i oracle queries. Moreover, an adversary A making q queries notices
the change with probability at most O(q2/2n).
Lemma 4 (Extracting a preimage under H from a preimage under
ROX
(H)). Given a key k and a message xˆ ∈ {0,1}∗ with ROX(H)
k
(xˆ) = y, we can
generate a message x ∈ M with Hk(x) = y using ℓ(x) − 1 calls to H and q(x)
oracle queries.
We are now ready to prove that ROX preserves the properties from Sect. 3
in the QRO model. To conserve space, we only summarize our proofs here,
providing the full proofs in Appendix D.
Theorem 1 (ROX preserves aPreQ). If H is (t′, ε′)-aPreQ, then ROX(H)
is (t, ε)-aPreQ with
t = t′ − poly(n)τH ; ε = ε′ +O(q2/2d)
Proof summary. We use a preimage target y for H as a preimage target for
ROX
(H). In the classical proof, y is correctly distributed because an adversary
would have to guess correctly some random points to query RO1,2. This argument
fails in the quantum setting. We instead use QRO programming to show that y
appears correctly distributed to a quantum adversary.
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Theorem 2 (ROX preserves PreQ). If H is (t′, ε′)-PreQ then ROX(H) is
(t, ε)-PreQ, where
t = t − poly(n)τH ; ε′ = ε +O(q2/2d)
Proof summary. An adversary for PreQ on ROX(H) can be run using a preimage
target y for H , since y will appear to be correctly distributed. The argument is
the same as that in the proof of Theorem 1, so we omit it here for brevity.
Theorem 3 (ROX preserves aSecQ). If H is (t′, ε′)-aSecQ then ROX(H) is
(t, ε)-aSecQ with
t = t′ − poly(n)τH ; ε = poly(n)ε′/(1 − 1/2n)(1 − poly(n)/2n)
Proof summary We embed a second-preimage target for H into a second-
preimage target for ROX(H) by adaptively programming RO1,2. We argue
that reprogramming the random oracles in this way is imperceptible to the
adversary.
Theorem 4 (ROX preserves SecQ). If H is (t′ε′)-SecQ then ROX(H) is
(t, ε)-SecQ, where
t = t′ − poly(n)τH ; ε = poly(n)ε′/(1 − 1/2n)(1 − poly(n)/2n)
Proof summary. Similarly to Theorem 3, here we embed a second-preimage
target for H into one for ROX(H) by programming RO1,2. Since we do not need
to program adaptively, however, the programming is straightforward. The proof
is similar to that of Theorem 3, so we omit it here for brevity.
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A CLAPS separation proofs
Here we show that CLAPS does not imply aPreQ, aSecQ, or ePreQ, completing
the diagram in Fig. 2.
A.1 CLAPS ↛ aPreQ
Theorem 5. If a collapsing function family exists, then there is a function fam-
ily H that is (t, ε)-CLAPS with negligible ε, but with AdvaPreQH = 1.
Proof summary: Since the key k in the collapsing game is chosen uniformly at
random, a collapsing function can have a constant number of “bad” keys that, for
example, result in a constant function Hk. Finding a preimage for such a function
is obviously trivial. Given a collapsing function F , we exhibit a function H that
is collapsing, but for which AdvaPreQH = 1.
Proof. Suppose F ∶ {0,1}n × {0,1}m → {0,1}d is (t, ε)-CLAPS, and define H as
follows:
Hk(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0d if k = 0n
Fk(x) o.w.
Lemma 5. H is (t, ε′)-CLAPS, where ε′ = ε − 1
2n
.
The obvious adversary suffices to break aPreQ on H : A picks k = 0n, and B
outputs any x. Since we assume ε to be negligible, ε′ is negligible as well, and
the theorem is immediate from Lemma 5.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 5). Let (A,B) be a correct qpt adversary with
AdvCLAPSH (A,B) = ε′. We construct a correct qpt adversary (A′,B′) for F as
follows:
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Constructing (A′,B′) from (A,B)
A′(1n, k):
1. If k = 0n, FAIL. Otherwise. . .
2. Run A(1n, k) to get S,X, y with
Pr[Hk(M(X)) = y] = 1.
3. Send the challenger S,X, y.
B′(1n, S,X):
1. Run B(1n, S,X) to get b.
2. Send b to the challenger.
We claim that (A′,B′) is correct: If A′ does not fail, then k /= 0n, and by the
premise that (A,B) is correct, Pr[Fk(M(X)) = y] = Pr[Hk(M(X)) = y∣k /= 0] =
1.
Suppose A′ doesn’t fail, and the challenger for (A′,B′) is running Game1.
Then B receives S,M(X), and (A,B) sees Game1. On the other hand, if the
challenger for (A′,B′) is running Game2, X is unmeasured, and (A,B) sees
Game2.
Since the probability that A′ fails is Pr[k = 0n] = 1
2n
, AdvCLAPSF (A′,B′) ≥
ε′ − 1
2n
. Therefore AdvCLAPSH ≤ Adv
CLAPS
F +
1
2n
= negl(n).
A.2 CLAPS ↛ aSecQ
Theorem 6. If a collapsing function family exists, then there is a function fam-
ily H that is (t, ε)-CLAPS with negligible ε, but with AdvaSecH = 1.
Proof summary: This proof uses the same H as the proof of Theorem 5. Given
a collapsing function F , this H is also collapsing, but has a single “bad” key kˆ
s.t. H
kˆ
(x) = 0d, ∀x ∈ {0,1}m. If an adversary can control the key and chooses kˆ,
then whichever x the challenger picks, any other element of dom(Hk) is a second
preimage. Since the proof is identical to Theorem 5, we omit it for brevity.
A.3 CLAPS ↛ ePreQ
Theorem 7. If a collapsing function family exists, then there is a function fam-
ily H that is (t, ε)-CLAPS with negligible ε, but AdvePreH = 1.
Proof summary: If the image yˆ of some element x in the domain of H is fixed,
regardless of the key k, then an adversary can find a preimage of an element y of
his choice easily: All he must do is choose y = yˆ, and whatever k the adversary
picks, x is a preimage. But if x is the only preimage of y, this property does not
help in creating superpositions of preimages to use in the collapsing game. So H
may still be collapsing.
Proof. Suppose F ∶ {0,1}n × {0,1}m → {0,1}d−1 is (t, ε)-CLAPS. We define a
new function H ∶ {0,1}n × {0,1}m → {0,1}d as follows:
Hk(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0d if x = 0m
1∥Fk(x) o.w.
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Lemma 6. H is (t, ε)-CLAPS.
The obvious adversary suffices to break ePreQ on H : A picks y = 0d and B
outputs 0m. Thus, the theorem is immediate from Lemma 6.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 6). Let (A,B) be a correct qpt adversary with
AdvCLAPSH (A,B) = ε
′. We construct a qpt adversary (A′,B′) for F as follows:
Constructing (A′,B′) from (A,B)
A′(1n, k):
1. Run A(1n, k) to get S,X, y with
Pr[Hk(M(X)) = y] = 1.
2. Measure MF (X) to get y′.
3. Send S,X, y′ to the challenger.
B′(1n, S,X):
1. Run B(S,X, y) to get b.
2. Send b to the challenger.
(A′,B′) is correct by construction. We claim that AdvCLAPSF (A′,B′) ≥ ǫ.
Consider the following cases:
1. Suppose y = 0d. Then by the premise that (A,B) is correct, X = ∣0m⟩, since
0m is the only preimage of 0d. In this case Game1 = Game2, sinceX =M(X),
so ∣Pr[b = 1 ∶ Game1]−Pr[b = 1 ∶ Game2]∣ = 0 for both (A,B) and (A′,B′).
2. Suppose y /= 0d, and the challenger for (A,B) is running Game1. Then B
receives M(X), so B sees Game2.
3. Suppose y /= 0d, and the challenger for (A,B) is running Game2. By the
premise that (A,B) is correct, when A produces X ,
X = ∑
x∈H−1(y)
αx ∣x⟩ = ∣1⟩ ( ∑
x∈F−1(y′)
αx ∣x⟩)
So the measurement at step 2 of A′ does not collapse X . Hence, B sees
Game2.
Therefore AdvCLAPSF (A′,B′) = ε′.
B aPreQ ≡ aPreSQ
Theorem 8. Equations 4 and 11 are equivalent. I.e., AdvaPreQH = Adv
aPreSQ
H
Proof (Proof of Theorem 8).
Let each part A, B of the adversary be a unitary operator and let n = ⌈lg ∣K∣⌉
be the size of a key, m = ⌈lg ∣M∣⌉ be the size of a message, and d = ⌈lg ∣D∣⌉ be the
size of a digest. We illustrate the circuits for three games in Figure 3.
Lemma 7. Game 1 is equivalent to Game 2.
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∣0n⟩ A
K
UH(x′)
✌
✌ k
∣0d⟩
Y
B
✌
✌
y
∣0m⟩ ✌✌ x
(a) Game1
≡
∣0n⟩ A
K
UH(x′)
✌
✌ k
∣0d⟩
Y
B
✌
✌
y
∣0m⟩ ✌✌ x
(b) Game2
≡
∣0n⟩ A
K
✌
✌
UH(x′)
k
∣0d⟩
y
B
✌
✌
y
∣0m⟩ ✌✌ x
(c) Game3
Fig. 3: Three equivalent games showing that measuring the K wire before the
end does not change the aPreSQ game—hence aPreSQ and aPreQ are equiva-
lent. Figure 3a is the same as aPreSQ; Figure 3c is functionally equivalent to
aPreQ; and Figure 3b is intermediate between the two. The state register S from
Equations 4 and 11 is omitted for clarity.
Lemma 8. Game 2 is equivalent to Game 3.
We claim that the theorem follows from Lemmas 7 and 8. Note that Game 1
is exactly the aPreSQ game, as defined in Equation 11. In Game 3, the output of
A and B, with the exception of the state register S, are measured immediately,
so without loss of generality, we may assume that their output is classical. Thus
Game 3 is equivalent to the aPreQ game (Equation 4).
In the following two proofs, let Mn denote measuring the first n qubits in
the standard basis and leaving the rest untouched. In other words,
Mn(ρ) = ∑
x∈{0,1}n
(∣x⟩ ⟨x∣⊗ I)ρ(∣x⟩ ⟨x∣ ⊗ I) (15)
Proof (Proof of Lemma 7).
It suffices to show that for any unitary B and all x ∈ {0,1}n, (∣x⟩ ⟨x∣ ⊗ I)
commutes with (In⊗B). This is immediate, since (In⊗B)(∣x⟩ ⟨x∣⊗I) = ∣x⟩ ⟨x∣⊗B.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 8).
We must show that UH(x′) commutes with Mn. Since
UH(x′) ∶ ∣K⟩ ∣Y ⟩↦ ∣K⟩ ∣Hk(x′)⊕ Y ⟩
is a unitary operator that leaves the K register untouched, it can be viewed as
using the K register solely as control bits for CNOT gates, interspersed with
unitaries on the Y register. Let CNOTi,j denote a CNOT gate with control i
and target j, and V denote an arbitrary unitary that acts on the Y register.
Then for 0 ≤ iℓ ≤ n and n + 1 ≤ jℓ ≤ n + d for all 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ q],
UH(x′) = (In ⊗ V0)
q
∏
ℓ=1
CNOTiℓ,jℓ(I
n
⊗ Vℓ) (16)
Given the definition of Mn in Equation 15, we must show all the factors in
Equation 16 commute with ∣x⟩ ⟨x∣ ⊗ Id. Clearly this is the case for In ⊗ Vℓ, by
the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 7. Similarly, it is well known that
measurement of the control qubit commutes with CNOT.
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C ROX constructions
C.1 Extracting compression-function collisions (Lemma 2)
Proof (Proof of Lemma 2). We claim that the following procedure extracts a
compression-function with overwhelming probability:
Extract-Collision(k, xˆ, xˆ′)
1. Let b1∥ . . . ∥bℓ = padROX(xˆ) and b′1∥ . . . ∥b′ℓ′ = padROX(xˆ′).
2. Let xi = bi∥ROX
(H)
k (b1∥ . . . ∥bi−1) and x′i = b
′
i∥ROX
(H)
k (b′1∥ . . . ∥b′i−1).
3. For i = 0 to min(ℓ, ℓ′) . . .
4. If xℓ−i /= x′ℓ′−i, output (x = xℓ−i, x
′ = x′ℓ′−i, i
∗ = ℓ − i).
Let x¯, x¯′ and be the first n bits of xˆ, xˆ′, and λ,λ′ be their respective lengths.
We must show that there always exists a colliding pair (x,x′). We consider two
cases:
– Case i. Suppose x¯ /= x¯′ or λ /= λ′. Then since xℓ and x′ℓ′ each contains at least
one full output from RO2, xℓ /= x′ℓ′ except with probability δ =
1
2n
. In this
case the inputs to the last application of Hk form a collision for Hk.
– Case ii. Otherwise, x¯ = x¯′ and λ = λ′. In this case, the padding applied to
xˆ and xˆ′ will be identical. But the mask schedule taken from RO1 will be
identical as well. So since xˆ /= xˆ′, there must be block pair, (bi∗ , b′i′∗) on which
they differ. Since the masks and padding match, these form a collision for
Hk.
C.2 Embedding messages (Lemma 3)
Proof (Proof of Lemma 3). Let h∥g = x, where ∣h∣ = b and ∣g∣ = d, and define the
following procedure:
Embed-Message(x, i)
1. Generate a random message xˆ of length λ ≥ bi.
2. If i = 1, let x¯ be the first n bits of x, adding bits from xˆ, starting with
the (m+ 1)st, if x isn’t long enough. Otherwise, let x¯ be the first n bits
of xˆ.
3. Let h1∥ . . . ∥hℓ = padROX(xˆ) with ∣hj ∣ = b.
4. Evaluate µi = ROX
(H)
k (x1∥ . . . ∥xi−1).
5. Program RO1(x¯, k, ν(i)) with g ⊕ µi.
6. Program the q′ ≤ q2(xˆ) outputs of RO2 contained in hi with x.
7. Let xˆ′ be the first λ bits of h1∥ . . . ∥hi−1∥h∥hi+1∥ . . . ∥hℓ.
8. Output xˆ′.
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In steps 5 and 6, the above procedure requires us to program a random
oracle. To do so, we invoke witness search from [ES15], where a witness is some
image of RO1,2 corresponding to an input that starts with x¯. Since x¯ is chosen at
random, and since the codomains of RO1,2 are much larger than their domains,
the random search problem in [HRS16] can be reduced to this, with 2n marked
items in a set of 2b−n ≥ 2n, so the success probability is O(q2/2n).
C.3 Extracting compression-function preimages (Lemma 4)
Proof (Proof of Lemma 4). We claim that the following procedure extracts a
collision-function preimage with overwhelming probability:
Extract-Preimage(k, xˆ)
1. Evaluate ROX
(H)
k
(x) up to the last application of Hk. Namely let
x1∥ . . . ∥xℓ = padROX(x)
x = xℓ∥ROX
(H)
k (x1∥ . . . ∥xℓ−1)⊕RO1(xˆ, k, ℓ)
2. Output x.
By construction, Hk(x) = y as desired. The only calls to H and RO1,RO2
are in the partial computation of ROX(H)(x). Since we omit one call to H , the
procedure calls it ℓ(x) − 1 times.
D ROX property-preservation proofs
D.1 ROX preserves aPreQ
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1). Let (A,B) be a (t, ε) quantum adversary for aPreQ
on ROX(H), making q = poly(n) oracle queries. We construct an adversary
(A′,B′) for H using an additional poly(n) oracle queries:
Constructing (A′,B′) from (A,B)
A′(1n):
1. Run k,S ← ARO1,2(1n), simulat-
ing quantum oracles RO1,2.
2. Output k,S.
B′(1n, S, y):
1. Run x← BRO1,2(1n, S, y).
2. Run Extract-Preimage(k,x)
to obtain a preimage x′ for y un-
der Hk.
3. Output x′.
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By Lemma 4, if ROX(Hk)(x) = y, then Hk(x′) = y, and A′ wins the aPreQ-
game. Note that y =Hk(g′∥h′) for g′∥h′ chosen at random, while A would expect
a yˆ to be Hk(g∥h), where g contains at least 2b bits of RO2(x¯, ⋅), and h =
d ⊕ RO1(x¯, ⋅) for some d. The view of (A,B) in the simulated run in (A′,B′)
is thus identical to the real aPreQ-game, unless (A,B) can distinguish y and yˆ
using at most q queries. We show that A can distinguish them with probability
at most q2/2n. Hence AdvaPreQH (A
′,B′) ≥ ε − q2/2n.
We argue that if some challenger that knew x were to reprogram RO1,2 on
inputs corresponding to x, no algorithm would be able to discover this except
with negligible probability. In the Witness-Search game from [ES15], let P (w)
output 1 if and only if RO2(w, ∣x∣, j) = g and ROX
(H)
k (x1∥ . . . ∥xℓ)⊕RO1(w,k, i) =
h for some 1 ≤ i, j ≤ ∣x∣. Next, let w = x¯ and pk = (k, ∣x∣). This amounts to finding
a preimage with a suffix from a set in a random function. Hence AdvWSSamp(A) ≤
O(q2/2d) by reducing a random search problem developed in [HRS16] to it. Thus
we can safely reprogram RO1,2 at points corresponding to P being true, and h, g
are indistinguishable from the random values supplied by B′.
D.2 ROX preserves aSecQ
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3). Let (A,B) be a (t, ε) adversary for aSecQ on
ROX
(H) making q = poly(n) oracle queries. We construct an adversary (A′,B′)
for H , using an additional ⌈ b+2n−1
2n
⌉ + poly(n) oracle queries:
Constructing (A′,B′) from (A,B)
A′(1n):
1. Run k,S ← ARO1,2(1n), simulat-
ing quantum oracles RO1,2.
2. Output k,S.
B′(1n, S, x):
1. Choose an index i ≤ poly(n).
2. Run Embed-Message(x, i) to
get xˆ ∈ dom(ROX(H)
k
) with x
embedded as the input to the ith
application of Hk.
3. Run BRO1,2(1n, S, xˆ′), to get xˆ′.
4. Run Extract-
Collision(k, xˆ, xˆ′) to get
(x,x′, i∗).
5. If i∗ /= i, FAIL. Output x′.
By Lemma 3,Embed-Message adds an additional i = poly(n) applications of
H and an additional ⌈ b+2n−1
2n
⌉+ i oracle queries and alters the success probability
of A by at most O(q/2n) = poly(n)/2n, where q = poly(n) is the number of
queries A makes. By Lemma 2, Extract-Collision adds ℓ(xˆ)+ℓ(xˆ′) = poly(n)
applications of H and q(xˆ) + q(xˆ′) = poly(n) oracle queries and fails w.p. 1
2n
.
Assuming both succeed, i = i∗ w.p. 1
poly(n)
. Hence AdvaSecQH (A
′,B′) ≥ ε(1 −
q/2n)(1 − 1/2n)/poly(n).
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